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Venturing into a Minefield: Employer Practices in a Post Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
State 
 
Introduction  
Traditionally, First Amendment rights were largely in the realm of individuals. 
Employees, not corporate owners, filed lawsuits asking for exemptions to corporate 
policy or secular law. This changed in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby. When the Supreme Court 
decided that Hobby Lobby did not have to provide contraception to its employees 
because doing so would violate the owners’ (and therein the corporation’s) religious 
beliefs, the ruling raised numerous questions about the scope of religious freedom and 
corporate rights. And, despite religious conservatives arguing that the Burwell decision 
would not substantially impact future Court decisions, many worried that the Court had 
expanded corporate rights to the detriment of the individuals the Constitution was 
designed to protect.  
This paper considers what kind of effects Burwell v. Hobby Lobby will have on 
future Court decisions regarding employee non-discrimination litigation. While the legal 
system moves slowly, a case like Burwell has the potential to impact the relationship 
between millions of employers and employees. Analyzing where the case came from and 
how it could change important economic relationships in our society can help 
policymakers, legal teams and everyday Americans understand the wider implications of 
a seemingly narrow Supreme Court ruling. I first lay out the relevant background of the 
case itself: who was involved, what were the basic arguments, and what exactly did the 
Court decide. Then I turn my attention to relevant legal precedent, which sheds light on 
the reasoning of the Court and the possible scope of the Burwell decision. After finding 
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that most of the Burwell decision was unprecedented, I then focus on some of the 
immediate and possible long-term effects of the Burwell case for employees. While I find 
multiple impacts of this decision on corporations and on free exercise law more 
generally, the most profound (and perhaps unintended) consequence of the Burwell ruling 
is a new balancing act in federal and state legal systems: religious freedom claims made 
by one individual (in this case on behalf of a corporation) versus the identity claims of 
another.  
Relevant Legislative Background and Case Law  
The Affordable Care Act (ACA), enacted in 2010, mandates employers with 50 or 
more full time or equivalent employees (FTEs) to provide health insurance that meets 
certain basic requirements. Otherwise, the employer has to pay a fine to the IRS of $100 
per day for each affected employee.1 These basic requirements include access to 
emergency medical services, vaccinations, prescription drug coverage, and laboratory 
services (HealthCare.gov, 2014). As a part of setting these requirements for health 
insurance, the Department of Health and Human Services asked the Institute of Medicine 
(IOM), a nonprofit organizations affiliated with the National Academy of Sciences, to 
conduct a study to find what specific health services for women were necessary for their 
health and well-being (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2014).  IOM’s 
study found that health insurance should cover all 20 forms of birth control approved by 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to ensure that all women have the access to the 
reproductive services that they need without worrying about cost. HHS adopted these 
guidelines, and they went into effect for plans that started after August 1, 2012.2  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 573 U. S. ____ (2014) p. 7/49	  2	  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 573 U. S. ____ (2014) p. 8/49	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When the Obama Administration announced these rules, HHS officials also 
announced that religious organizations and religious non-profit corporations were exempt 
from the contraception requirement. This exclusion was not without precedent; 
frequently, religious non-profit organizations are granted exemptions from legal 
mandates. To give one example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which requires 
companies to hire without looking at an applicant’s race, gender, or religious faith, has an 
exemption for non-profit religious groups, particularly with regards to members of their 
clergy.3 The exemption to the contraception mandate is not the only exemption for 
religious groups in the ACA. If one is a member of a religious group that objects to 
medical insurance, Social Security or Medicare, or if one belongs to a religious “mutual 
aid system” outside of traditional insurance, one does not have to pay the fine associated 
with not having health coverage (Madigan, 2014). However, all for-profit corporations, 
religious or not, were required to provide contraception to their employees.4  
Hobby Lobby is a for-profit corporation that is primarily owned by one family: 
the Greens. The Greens objected to the new health insurance requirements because their 
religious faith said that certain forms of contraception were forms of abortion.5 Under the 
Affordable Care Act, the Greens were required to cover these devices or pay $475 
million dollars in penalties to the IRS, a figure derived from the stated penalty amount 
multiplied by the number of Hobby Lobby employees who received health insurance.6 
Hobby Lobby sued the Department of Health and Human Services asking for a religious 
exemption to the contraception requirement. The U.S. District Court for the Western 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (2011) 4	  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 573 U. S. ____ (2014) p. 9/49	  5	  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 573 U. S. ____ (2014) p. 8/49	  6	  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 573 U. S. ____ (2014) p. 15/49	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District of Oklahoma denied a preliminary injunction and ruled against Hobby Lobby, 
saying that the mandate did not violate the Green’s religious freedom. Hobby Lobby 
appealed the decision to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals 
disagreed with the lower court, and ruled that Hobby Lobby was a person that could raise 
a claim under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and that the contraception mandate 
violated Hobby Lobby’s right to the free exercise of religion. The case was appealed 
again and in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court 
agreed with Hobby Lobby and granted the corporation an exemption in a 5-4 ruling. This 
decision marked the first case where a for-profit corporation was granted any sort of 
religious freedom protection. In plain terms, Burwell took a right generally reserved to 
individuals and expanded it in ways that could completely change free exercise 
jurisprudence.  
 To understand the decision in Burwell, it is important to examine the briefs from 
the petitioner and the respondent. The petitioner, the Department of Health and Human 
Services, used the text of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and various 
Supreme Court cases to argue that granting an exemption to Hobby Lobby would 
broaden the scope of RFRA far beyond what Congress had intended.7 The government 
argued that even if Hobby Lobby counted as a “person” in RFRA, the exemption would 
still fail because the burden of providing contraceptive coverage is indirect. The mandate 
fulfills a compelling government interest in public health and gender equality, and it is 
the least restrictive means for providing female employees access to contraception.8 The 
respondents, the Green family, used the definition of “person” under the Dictionary Act 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Brief for the Petitioner, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc. 573 U. S. ____ (2014) p.13 
8 Brief for the Petitioner, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc. 573 U. S. ____ (2014) p.15	  
  5 
to argue that RFRA would apply to Hobby Lobby a legal entity with personhood rights.9 
They also argued that even indirectly providing abortifacients is a substantial burden on 
their religious values, and the broad “interests” asserted by the government in this case 
are not compelling interests because they are too general and vague. Finally, the Green 
family maintained that mandate is also not the least restrictive means for providing 
contraception access because multiple groups have already received exemptions without 
harming the entire system.10  
 The decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. dealt with two separate, but 
related issues. The first involved the scope of First Amendment protection from neutral 
laws. Most laws do not have any effect on religious practice. However, some laws have 
unintended consequences for people of faith. Either they can follow the law and violate 
their personal religious code, or follow their faith and risk fines and legal punishment. 
Many religious individuals file lawsuits asking for narrow exemptions to secular law to 
avoid this burden on their conscience. By looking at the cases that the Court used in the 
background sections of its opinion, as well as the cases directly cited in the substantive 
part of the majority opinion, we see how much of the Burwell decision was based on the 
logic of legal precedent in free exercise cases.  
The second, and more complex, part of this review focuses on the cases that 
supported the idea that for-profit corporations could have religious freedom rights. There 
is very little case law on this second aspect of Burwell. Very few businesses have ever 
raised religious freedom claims; they have either been non-profit groups (who have won 
certain exemptions) or sole proprietors of very small for-profit businesses (who have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Brief for the Respondents, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc. 573 U. S. ____ (2014) p.14 
10 Brief for the Respondents, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc. 573 U. S. ____ (2014) p.15-16	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never succeeded in getting an exemption).  This expansion of corporate rights is 
important for understanding Burwell because this part of the ruling has generated the 
most controversy, particularly related to the ruling’s scope. Only by looking at the history 
of both of these issues can the Burwell decision be understood as either a natural 
progression from previous cases or an abrupt departure from them.  
The First Amendment to the Constitution states that Congress cannot make a law 
that prohibits the free exercise of religion. But what happens when a neutral law conflicts 
with a religious belief? Numerous Supreme Court cases address this very issue. However, 
all of these cases only addressed either an individual’s right to object to secular law on 
the basis of religious faith or a solely religious group or congregation that saw a secular 
statute as violating some fundamental part of religious practice. As such, these religious 
freedom cases inform some of the reasoning in Burwell, but they do not fully explain why 
the Court decided to expand these rulings to for-profit corporations.  
The history of free exercise law can be rather convoluted. Throughout its history, 
the court has created various legal “tests” to determine if a law infringes on religious 
belief and, if so, if the individual should get an exemption. One of the more recent tests 
created by the court was the compelling interest test, which was first written in Sherbert 
v. Verner (1963). Under the compelling interest test, if a law creates a “substantial 
burden” on religious faith, the government has to prove that the law itself is “narrowly 
tailored” to achieve a “compelling government interest.” If the government cannot prove 
either of those two conditions, the Court requires that the religious individual be granted 
an exemption. 11 In the case of Sherbert, South Carolina had to pay the plaintiff 
unemployment benefits because she was fired for refusing to work on days that would 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Sherbert v. Verner 374 U.S. 398 (1963) 
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violate her religious faith.12 This compelling interest test remained a Supreme Court 
standard for 20 years until Smith (1990), which identified the “neutral law of general 
applicability.”  
While both the petitioner (the Department of Health and Human Services) and 
respondent (Hobby Lobby) made passing mentions to Sherbert in their legal briefs, the 
respondent only used the case in its brief overview of the history of free exercise law. 
The petitioner, however, used Sherbert to argue that the Court should reject Hobby 
Lobby’s claim because the compelling interest test only protects individuals, not 
corporations. Both petitioner and respondent tied their argument to Sherbert for two 
reasons. The first is to hopefully connect their argument with one of the hallmark cases in 
free exercise law. By citing Sherbert, the lawyers were trying to claim that their 
respective arguments arose from significant precedent, even if the respondent is trying to 
broaden what sort of organizations free exercise law should apply to. Both sides also used 
Sherbert to tie their argument to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which played a 
central role in Burwell and will be discussed in greater detail later.   
 The legal test changed in 1990 away from Sherbert and compelling interest in 
Employment Division, Dept of Human Resources v. Smith. In Smith, the Supreme Court 
ruled that an individual cannot violate a “neutral law of general applicability”, in this case 
drug laws, simply because of their religious faith. As long as the law was neutral, a 
religious individual could not challenge it in the court system. The decision in Smith 
severely curtailed the claims that religious individuals could make in the courts. While 
the petitioner used Smith to further bolster the argument that corporations should not have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  The	  plaintiff	  refused	  to	  work	  on	  Saturdays	  and	  when	  she	  failed	  to	  show	  up	  for	  work	  on	  Saturdays,	  she	  was	  fired.	  	  Sherbert v. Verner 374 U.S. 398 (1963)	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any religious freedom claims, the respondent used the case in a very different way. 
Hobby Lobby argued that the ruling in Smith shows that abstaining from certain acts (like 
refusing to support certain types of birth control) is a part of religious free exercise. The 
majority of the Supreme Court agreed with the respondent’s interpretation of Smith, even 
though the opinion itself only made passing references to the decision.  
 Because Smith appeared to change the entirety of free exercise law, religious 
individuals and groups lobbied Congress to reinstate religious freedom protection in the 
federal courts. The result was the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), a 1993 
law that states that if a “sincerely-held religious belief” contradicted a neutral law, the 
government had to prove that the law was narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling 
government interest; otherwise the law is an unconstitutional burden on religious 
practice. The language should seem familiar; it was directly borrowed from Sherbert. In 
fact, the law itself was framed as simply a “restoration” of the compelling interest test. 
However, after the law was passed, scholars raised questions about whether the law 
would be the best way to protect the balance between religious freedom and the goals of 
secular society.  
 The first concern speaks to the broadness of the statute itself. While congressional 
legislation is usually vague, RFRA does not provide any clarifying meaning for what 
constitutes a “compelling government interest” or “a substantial burden” on religious 
practice. Instead the bill’s supporters decided to let the courts decide what these terms 
meant. The main reason for this was purely practical; the bill’s coalition of sponsors was 
so broad that groups on the right and on the left could not agree on a standard (Berg, 
1994). Some scholars view RFRA’s vague wording as a positive. Because Congress 
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decided to pass a law directing the judicial branch to use a particular standard, in theory 
cases involving free exercise claims are held to a higher standard of scrutiny (Berg, 1994, 
29). However, others argue that RFRA is only a symbolic victory because the courts have 
consistently used the same vague language to wiggle out of protecting religious freedom 
(Ryan, 1992, 1414).  
RFRA returns the judicial branch to the compelling interest test, which in theory 
returns the Court to a higher level of scrutiny for free exercise cases. However, the case 
law under the compelling interest test is actually not very sympathetic to religious 
interests. Eisbruber and Sager (1994) argue that the Supreme Court has tried to escape the 
compelling interest test since it decided Sherbert because the test’s system of balancing 
was unworkable (443). The Supreme Court rejected the appeals of religious individuals 
in 13 out of the 17 religious freedom cases that came before the Court after Sherbert 
(Ryan, 1992, 1414).  Lower federal courts were no better. The Courts of Appeals heard 
97 free exercise cases. They rejected the claims of religious individuals in 85 of them 
(Ryan, 1992, 1417). Smith only made explicit what many people knew to be the case: that 
religious people could very rarely rely on the judicial system to uphold their claim of 
religious freedom from neutral laws (Ryan, 1992, 1416). Even the bill’s supporters 
agreed that case law before Smith was less than an ideal standard. Berg (1994) 
emphasizes the courts should defer more to religious freedom under RFRA than they did 
in the cases before Smith (26-27, 30-34) on the grounds that a legislative statute provides 
a much firmer basis for decisions that protect civil liberties. With that firmer base, the 
Court should be able to protect religion more substantively (Berg, 1994: 29).   
  10 
  Scholars at the time of RFRA’s passage were also divided on the kind of effect 
that RFRA would have in free exercise cases. Eisgruber and Sager (1994, 455) argue that 
RFRA could be interpreted to mean religious practice supersedes any sort of government 
law or regulation because there is always a “less-restrictive means” of producing the 
same result. Without a definition of compelling interest, courts could argue that no law 
ever meets that standard. Ryan (1992) was much less optimistic about the fate of 
religious exercise under RFRA, arguing that RFRA was a purely symbolic victory that 
would allow Congress to feel like they had done something without actually making 
substantial gains for religious freedom. Berg’s position is halfway between the two. In his 
view, the Court would (and should) use moderation when applying RFRA, rather than 
using the compelling interest test language without upholding the spirit of the law. He 
strongly believed that the “substantial burden” language used in RFRA would limit when 
the law could be used to benefit religion (Berg, 1994: 48). 
 Since RFRA was passed, very few cases about religious freedom have reached the 
Supreme Court and none of them fully dealt with the scope of RFRA’s religious freedom 
protection for individuals. However, one case that came before the Supreme Court in the 
early 2000s gave some indication that RFRA would broaden the scope of religious 
freedom protection. In Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Benficiente Uniao do Vegetal 
(2005), the Supreme Court ruled that the use of a drug called hoasca in religious 
ceremonies should be allowed under the Controlled Substances Act. The law needed to 
make this exemption because the government did not successfully prove that it had a 
“compelling interest” in allowing no exemptions to drug laws.13 Such a shift in rulings 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  “Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal” 	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from Smith to Gonzales shows that RFRA provided a stronger shield for individual 
religious freedom, just as Congress had intended.  
Even though some cases showed that RFRA could radically expand religious 
freedom protections, other Court cases strictly limited what government entities to which 
RFRA could apply. RFRA as a statute originally applied to federal, state and local 
governments. In City of Boerne v. Flores (1996), the Supreme Court struck down 
RFRA’s provisions that applied to the states (Hamilton 2005). While the decision did not 
declare the entire law unconstitutional, it seriously weakened the effects of RFRA. In 
response, Congress passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
(RLUIPA) in 2000, which, in the process of limiting what state practices would be 
affected by federal religious freedom protections, deleted any direct references to the 
First Amendment.14 While the original constitutional question of whether or not Congress 
can require states to have equal protections for religious freedom is irrelevant to the 
Burwell decision, the majority opinion uses the distinction between RFRA/RLUIPA 
protections and First Amendment claims when deciding the Burwell case.15  
In both Gonzales and Boerne, the Supreme Court ruled in ways that expanded 
religious freedom for individuals. When these cases were decided, the Court, and perhaps 
original sponsors of RFRA, were focused on protecting individual freedom. Their claim 
that for-profit corporations are entitled to that same strong shield is a new demand. 
Corporations are a legal entity separate from the person(s) that own them. Most 
companies become corporations to protect the owner from having to pay any debts that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 573 U. S. ____ (2014) p. 6-7/49 
15 This argument was cited in Alito’s majority opinion (Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 573 U. S. ____ (2014) p. 
6-7/49). This point was ignored by Kennedy’s concurring opinion (who sided with the majority because the 
government showed a less restrictive alternative to the mandate) and Ginsberg’s dissent (who disagreed 
with the decision based on the harm to third parties).  
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the corporation might accumulate over time. If a corporation goes bankrupt, its owners 
don’t lose their life savings trying to pay back the corporation’s debt because the 
corporation is seen as a separate legal person. The Burwell case was unusual because it 
specifically tried to break that mindset of corporate separateness.  The Green family in 
this case was arguing that when their corporation provided its employees with certain 
forms of contraception, it violated their freedom of religion. When the Court decided to 
rule in favor of Hobby Lobby, it expanded religious freedom to a legal entity that had 
never had that right.   
That is not to say that religious groups and non-profit corporations had not asked 
for exemptions to neutral employment laws before Burwell. The so-called ministerial 
exception was first created in 1972 and was designed to allow churches to choose their 
own clergy without fear of anti-discrimination lawsuits (Hamilton 2005). In theory, this 
exception was narrowly tailored, and any secular employees hired by a religious 
organization (janitors, secretaries) were still subject to federal nondiscrimination policies 
(Hamilton 193). The ministerial exemption also, at least in its original form, only applied 
to organizations that were entirely religious in nature. In EEOC v. Mississippi College, 
652 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980), the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a religiously 
affiliated college did not qualify for exemptions to Title VII because it was not a religious 
entity (Hamilton 2005).  
The only time the Supreme Court has dealt with the ministerial exception is in 
2011. In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, the Court ruled that a teacher who was fired from a ministry 
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position could not sure her employer for violating the Americans With Disabilities Act.16 
It is the first case where the Supreme Court confirmed a ministerial exception to 
employment law. While this exemption is narrow, it is the first indication that the 
Supreme Court might allow an employer’s faith to impact employment processes.  
The ministerial exemption allowed only non-profit and exclusively religious 
organizations to bring free exercise claims, not for-profit corporations. The expansion of 
religious freedom rights to for-profit corporations is largely unprecedented. According to 
the majority opinion in Burwell, the Supreme Court has only dealt with one free exercise 
claim involving religious businesses. Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Market was a case 
decided in 1961, long before RFRA or Smith. Orthodox Jewish business owners brought 
a lawsuit against blue laws (laws that mandated business closure on Sundays to provide a 
“day of rest”) in the state of Massachusetts.17 The Supreme Court decided against Crown 
Kosher Foods, saying Sunday blue laws were constitutional and that they had the secular 
purpose of providing a day of rest.  
 While on first glance, Gallagher would not support a corporation’s right to free 
exercise claims under the First Amendment, Justice Alito (the writer of the majority 
opinion in Burwell) argues that this case is important because the earlier Court’s decision 
did not reject the case because the party bringing the lawsuit was a business. Instead it 
decided the case purely based on the merits of the free exercise claim. The fact that the 
Court did not reject the claim entirely means that earlier Courts would have supported 
giving closely held corporations religious freedom exemptions, according to the majority 
opinion. Other scholars have also cited United States v. Lee 455 U.S. 252 (1982) and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission 565 U.S. ___ (2012) 	  
17 Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961) 
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Braunfield v. Brown 366 U.S. 599 (1961) as other cases where sole proprietors of 
businesses were allowed to raise free exercise complaints, even though the Supreme 
Court did not cite them as such in the opinion (Colombo 2015). 
While the Supreme Court itself found very few cases where for-profit 
corporations have been given religious freedom rights, supporters of corporations have 
identified a few more, albeit weaker, precedents. Before Burwell, two district courts 
recognized the right of for-profit corporations to bring free exercise claims (Colombo 
160). This reasoning is not limited to district courts either. The Eleventh Circuit Court in 
the case Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v Broward County (2006) 
stated that corporations have “Fourteenth Amendment rights of equal protection, due 
process, and, through incorporation, the free exercise of religion” (Colombo, 2015: 162). 
In Storemans Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2009), the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals gave a closely held for-profit corporation standing in a lawsuit because of 
“associational standing.” Associational standing is the idea that corporations can have 
standing as proxies for the owners. It’s a slightly different argument than the one used in 
Burwell (that corporations themselves have free exercise rights), but it is related 
(Colombo 2015). Some scholars see these cases, as well as State ex rel. McClure v. 
Sports and Health Club, Inc. 370 N.W.2nd 844 (Minn. 1985), as possible precedent for 
Burwell, although none of these cases was cited in the opinion (Colombo 2015). While 
none of these cases were cited, these cases are important because they show that the idea 
of giving a for-profit corporation some sort of religious freedom protection is not a new 
legal concept. Court members might have heard about Broward County and Selecky when 
they were decided, and the legal rationale used in these cases might have informed their 
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logic in Burwell. In other words, while Burwell is the first Supreme Court case to endorse 
religious freedom for corporations, the legal rationale did not completely rise out of 
nowhere.  
Potential Effects of Burwell v Hobby Lobby 
The majority in Burwell ruled that Hobby Lobby should receive a religious 
exemption to the contraception mandate because it violated the religious beliefs of the 
owners. According to Justice Alito, author of the majority opinion, the Green family 
should not have to violate their religious faith simply because the issue in the case dealt 
with their role as business owners. Instead, the Court should come to a decision on this 
case just like they would on any other religious freedom case: by applying the compelling 
interest test found in RFRA.18 The contraception mandate violated RFRA because the 
government had already proved that a less-restrictive way to provide contraception could 
work. The majority then ruled that Hobby Lobby should be able to separate out 
contraception from their health plan and have the insurance company pay for the entire 
cost of birth control, just like certain religious non-profits under the ACA’s original 
guidelines.19   
After the Court released its decision, which included a fiery dissent read from the 
bench by Ruth Bader Ginsburg, I wanted to determine what impacts, if any, Burwell 
would have on corporate practices and future Supreme Court cases. These impacts can be 
separated into two groups: immediate impacts and long-term impacts. Immediate impacts 
include the other cases in front of federal courts requesting exemptions to the 
contraception mandate, as well as the impact on female employees who have lost their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 573 U. S. ____ (2014) p. 16-31/49 
19 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 573 U. S. ____ (2014) p. 43/49	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birth control coverage because of the beliefs of their employer. After considering these 
immediate impacts, I then turn to the possible long-term impacts of Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby. Here I consider possible shifts in the relationship between shareholders and 
corporate directors, raising the threshold for what is considered a “compelling 
government interest,” possible new challenges to “essential” health care. Further, I 
evaluated the Court’s newest challenge: trying to determine if corporate religious values 
are more worthy of protection that anti-discrimination based on individual identity 
groups, or vice versa.   
The Burwell decision obviously had immediate impacts on Hobby Lobby’s 
female employees who lost access to essential contraception because of the corporate 
owners’ religious beliefs. Even though these women still qualify for contraception at a 
separate health exchange set up by the Obama administration, this additional step may 
discourage women who may want to use birth control but are not aware of the federal 
program that subsidizes the cost. Hobby Lobby is required by law to inform their 
employees in writing of any insurance changes, so these women are aware that they no 
longer have access to these four kinds of birth control. However, it is unclear how much 
information this letter contains; Hobby Lobby might not have even told their female 
employees that the exchange exists. Instead, the insurance company would have sent out 
a separate publication with that information. It is also unclear how confusing using that 
secondary system might be to use. If the system is unclear or confusing, female 
employees might not even think something like an IUD is an option for them, even if a 
doctor recommends it.20   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Financial burden is the major reason why low-income women do not get IUDs, though studies have 
shown many of them would use one if the cost is reduced because they last longer. See Sonfield (2014).  
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However, the ruling did not just apply to Hobby Lobby. It also applied to all 
“closely held, family corporations” who had a religious belief on contraception. After the 
Hobby Lobby decision was issued this past summer, other corporations proceeded to sue 
the Department of Health and Human Services for an exemption. There are 49 separate 
lawsuits being argued in lower courts, involving 193 different for-profit corporations that 
are asking for some sort of exemption to the contraception mandate (The Becket Fund).21 
Not all of these lawsuits are carbon copies of Burwell, but all of them could use that 
decision as support for their respective case. For example, Hobby Lobby only objected to 
4 of the 20 FDA-mandated types of birth control. While some of these new lawsuits only 
object to the same types of birth control that Hobby Lobby opposed, other plaintiffs (such 
as Eden Foods) object to all kinds of birth control and want a complete exemption from 
providing contraception to their employees. Critics of the decision fear that Burwell 
would allow a company to provide no contraception to their employees, even though that 
was not what Hobby Lobby itself was seeking. If these lawsuits are successful (two have 
been remanded by the Supreme Court after the Burwell decision, and many are still 
awaiting a ruling), many more women would be without necessary medical coverage 
because their boss objected to their ability to access contraception on religious grounds. 
Other than the challenges to the contraception mandate, there has been little 
action by government officials or corporations in the aftermath of the Court’s decision. 
The decision itself may have been largely unprecedented, but it also has not thus far 
caused for-profit corporations to claim a religious faith to discriminate against individual 
employees like opponents worried it would. One scholar has gone as far as to say that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 This number does not include the 56 additional cases raised by 140 different non-profit plaintiffs 
(religious organizations and religiously-affiliated schools) objecting to the same mandate.   
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controversy over Burwell is not based on the decision itself. Instead, the controversy is a 
reflection of the debate over whether or not there should be religious exemptions to 
secular law in the first place (Horwitz 2014). This larger culture war about the place of 
religion in society has only grown more heated since mainstream public opinion shifted 
towards supporting same-sex marriage (Horwitz, 2014). The actual decision in Burwell, 
according to Horwitz, was a straightforward application of RFRA. Without the larger 
culture war about the place of religion in public life, Burwell would have not sparked the 
same level of debate as it did in the summer of 2014 (Horwitz, 2014).  
While Horwitz believes we might be making a big deal out of a straightforward 
decision, the fact remains that Burwell is a significant departure from existing case law 
and it will shape a multitude of legal questions. Because of the speed of the legal system 
itself, cases invoking Burwell as precedent might not reach the Supreme Court for a few 
years. However, the decision has some potential to change how individual corporations 
work with their shareholders and has generated numerous new legal questions that the 
Court will have to navigate in the coming years.  
While most of the popular media coverage over Burwell v Hobby Lobby has 
focused on the harm that could come to progressive causes because of this decision, other 
scholars see it as a potential opportunity to affect change within the corporate structure. 
Currently shareholders can pass proposals, or motions, about corporate policy either 
related to the internal workings of the company or about social issues, including women’s 
rights, LGBT rights or environmental protection (Neitz, 14). These motions are not 
binding and many activists have avoided using them because the dominant focus of 
corporations has historically been profit maximization. If the proposal did not fit this 
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narrow goal of maximizing profit, activists felt like it would be pointless to even bring it 
up in the boardroom because the company would either vote it down or pass the proposal 
and then choose to ignore it later.  
However, the decision in Burwell gave some corporations another possible goal 
that might be more sympathetic to activists’ demands: to conduct business in a way that 
promotes their religious beliefs. With this decision, activists could appeal to a 
corporation’s religious viewpoint to pass these proposals. Neitz argues that, with time, 
this ruling will expand to corporations who have “moral values” that are not directly tied 
to religious faith (26). Because corporations can be held more accountable for their 
decisions, activists might have more success convincing corporations to become leaders 
in making moral decisions, not just the ones that are best for the bottom line (Neitz, 30). 
The most recent high profile example of a corporation acting morally despite cutting into 
profits is CVS Pharmacy. The company recently decided to stop selling tobacco products 
in its stores. Even though selling cigarettes creates millions of dollars in revenue, CVS 
felt like selling them went against their mission of providing products that promote health 
and wellness (Neitz, 30). Neitz believes that because of the Burwell decision, more 
companies will start making decisions based on moral and religious values rather than 
profit maximization. Some of these values can include stronger environmental protection, 
equal pay, and equal opportunity in the workplace (Neitz 2014).  
Neitz’s argument is an interesting and compelling one. However, this strategy of 
corporate morality is unlikely to be as effective as he hopes. Religion and religious 
liberty occupy a special place in case law precedent that does not transfer to moral values 
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not grounded in religious belief or practice. While we might see some of this change as 
the result of Burwell, it will come from within the corporation, not from the legal system.  
While the change in relationship between shareholder and corporate owners is by 
no means guaranteed, there are many other legal impacts of the Burwell decision. The 
majority opinion also created three new legal difficulties that later Supreme Courts will 
have to navigate. To give one example of a new legal hurdle created by Burwell, the 
decision creates a much higher standard that the government has to follow to show a law 
is the least-restrictive policy available. In the majority opinion, the justices decided that 
the most straightforward way to ease religious burdens would be for the government to 
directly provide contraception to its citizens out of its own budget (Melone 2014). 
Regardless of the cost of such a program, simply letting the government pick up the tab 
for particular parts of health insurance that might cause religious objections could lead to 
a much more expansive role for the government (Melone 2014). It could also discourage 
federal departments from creating their own narrower religious accommodations for fear 
that they will be used in court cases to prove there is a “less restrictive” way of providing 
a service (Melone 2014).  
The Supreme Court also has to deal with more challenges related to what is 
considered “essential health care.” When Congress passed the ACA, the law created 
minimum standards for health insurance coverage. One of those standards was the 
prevision of contraception, but the Court decided that the contraception mandate violated 
religious freedom. The Supreme Court in its decision decided not to clarify if other 
exemptions would be required to satisfy religious objections, but it is likely that the Court 
will have to decide cases on other aspects of health care and religious freedom because of 
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this case. After all, religious objections to different health care practices are not limited to 
contraception. Different religious groups object to animal tissue used in surgeries; certain 
types of in-vitro fertilization and fertility treatments; vaccines containing fetal tissue, 
blood particles or animal parts; any medical treatment derived from stem cells; mental 
health treatments; hospice care or any medical intervention at all.22 Because so many 
individuals receive health insurance through their employer, thousands of people could be 
affected if an employer decides not to cover blood transfusions or certain vaccines 
because of their own religious faith. 23 When the Court decided not to clarify if any other 
exemptions would be required under RFRA, it opened up a new can of worms for future 
Court cases.  
The most far-reaching change in Supreme Court decision-making that Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby affected is a new balancing act between religious freedom claims and so-
called identity claims. Since the beginning of the Civil Rights Movement in the 1950s, 
traditionally marginalized groups (people of color, women, and LGBT individuals) have 
asked the courts for increased legal protection and programs to ensure equal opportunity 
under the law. Many of cases are anti-discrimination lawsuits, where a member of a 
minority group sues against an employer or business for treating him or her differently 
because of some aspect of their identity. In previous decisions, the Court system treated 
all for-profit companies under the same lens of scrutiny, but that could change if the 
company was arguing that their religious belief required discriminatory treatment. In 
amicus briefs, opponents cautioned that if corporations were given religious freedom 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Brief for the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists as Amicus Curiae, Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores Inc. 573 U. S. ____ (2014)	  23	  Brief for the Jewish Social Policy Action Network as Amicus Curiae, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores 
Inc. 573 U. S. ____ (2014)	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protection, they might use it as a reason to not comply with equal opportunity 
employment guidelines.24 Opponents worry that if the case is interpreted broadly, the 
Supreme Court could undo decades of civil rights legislation under the guise of 
protecting religious freedom.  
It is not just opponents of the Burwell decision that see that giving corporations 
religious freedom rights could change how anti-discrimination cases are handled. One 
such supporter of religious freedom rights for corporations is Ronald Colombo. In his 
recently published book, Colombo tells the story of Elane Photography v. Vanessa 
Wilock (2008), a New Mexico lawsuit. Wilock wanted Elane Photography to take photos 
at her and her partner’s commitment ceremony. However, the photographer refused, 
saying that her religious faith objected to same-sex couples. The Supreme Court of New 
Mexico found that Elane Photography violated the New Mexico Human Rights Act 
(Colombo 2015). Colombo argues that this decision is wrong because it institutes 
majoritarian values onto people whose viewpoints are less common (Colombo 2015). 
Wilock should have just used another photography business, rather than insisting on this 
particular photographer. Colombo gives another example of protected corporate behavior 
under the First Amendment; he would allow a group of pharmacists to refuse to carry the 
“morning after pill” as long as a sufficient number of pharmacies still carried the drug 
(2015: 218).25 Both of these cases could be seen as examples of discrimination that would 
be allowable under the Burwell decision.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union, et. al. as Amicus Curiae, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores 
Inc. 573 U. S. ____ (2014)	  25	  It is important to note that separating out family planning services (like the morning-after pill) from 
places where people routinely get health care can lead to less effective contraception use and therefore 
more unplanned pregnancies. See Sonfield (2014).  
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While neither of these examples is as extreme as refusing to hire someone 
because of their race or their gender, Colombo does not provide a clear line between 
behavior that would be protected under religious freedom and behavior that is unfairly 
discriminatory. Without a clearly defined limit for protected behavior, corporations could 
hold beliefs that are flawed by our modern standards (racial segregation for example) and 
the judicial system could protect the corporation and not the individuals affected. 
Colombo does try and limit the impact that granting religious freedom to for-profit 
companies would have by arguing that existing exemptions for religion under current law 
have remained narrow in practice. No religious group has used its exemption to Title VII, 
for example, to systematically exclude racial minorities from employment. Religious 
groups only use this exemption to ask candidates about their religious faith in interviews, 
and to exclude groups (mostly women and LGBT people) from the clergy that they 
believe should not lead their congregation. Colombo argues that it would be unlikely that 
for-profit companies would try to expand exemptions based on religious faith to things 
like racial segregation, because their non-profit counterparts have not (Colombo 2015). 
Other than the argument that certain things (like racial discrimination) will not happen 
because no group has tried to use an exemption in that manner, Colombo gives no clear 
reason why religious individuals could not use an exemption to discriminate against 
minority groups and why the Court should protect individuals, not business owners, in 
those cases.    
Without judicial relief, groups that feel like they have been discriminated against 
by a business would have to resort to boycotts or other forms of direct action against 
corporations to change their policy (Colombo 2015). Many family-owned religious 
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companies are large and have a wide customer base. Boycotts against these companies 
can work because of increased negative media coverage, but many of them are 
unsuccessful at shutting down a business or making them change their employment 
practices. To give one example, after the decision in Burwell, many people decided to 
boycott Hobby Lobby, either individually or in online petitions circulated by liberal 
groups (Bradford 2014). Despite the boycott, this year Hobby Lobby made $3.3 billion 
dollars in revenue, according to Forbes (Hobby Lobby 2014). Once a business has a 
following, boycotts are hard to organize and likely do not work in the way that organizers 
hope they would.  
While some of these implications are very severe, others interpret the decision 
narrowly, arguing that only small, “closely held” for-profit corporations could have a 
religious faith. However, nowhere in the Burwell decision is a “closely held family 
corporation” defined. In fact, different agencies of the federal government have different 
definitions of a closely held corporation. The IRS defines it as a corporation “where more 
than half of the stock is owned (directly or indirectly) by five or fewer individuals at any 
time in the second half of the year” (Desilver 2014). Hobby Lobby is actually a different 
kind of corporation, an S corporation, that cannot have more than 100 shareholders 
overall, but where the family itself all counts as one shareholder. U.S. securities law 
makes the distinction on whether or not a company is closely held by whether or not the 
corporation has more than 2,000 shareholders, a completely different rule than the IRS 
(Desilver).  
Because of these different definitions, companies that are much larger than Hobby 
Lobby can claim to be “closely held” including Cargill, one of the largest private 
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corporations in the country (Desilver 2014). If Cargill decides to not cover a product on 
their health insurance plan because of religious reasons, all 143,000 of its employees 
would be affected by the change (Desilver 2014). Hobby Lobby, by contrast, only has 
23,000 employees (Hobby Lobby, 2014). Neither business is very small; the decisions of 
these “closely held” corporations could impact more people than the Court might have 
intended it to. Companies that are not closely held or even private could possibly claim 
free exercise rights as well. The Supreme Court in its decision tore down the difference 
between non-profit and for-profit corporations, yet did not explain why its decision had to 
be limited to these closely held corporations. A future Court could decide that the 
distinction is unworkable and grant all corporations religious freedom rights, even if they 
have thousands of unrelated shareholders (Neitz 2014).  
 The legal system is designed to be slow moving. While we have seen some 
challenges to the contraception mandate, corporations have been reluctant to declare a 
new religious faith or ask for exemptions to other areas of employment law- at least so 
far. However, companies might find it beneficial to declare a religious faith as more 
groups begin to ask for protections based on identity claims. Deciding whether a group 
should get specific protections based on one characteristic is already difficult. By adding 
in religious faith into the conversation, Burwell only complicated that process. The Court 
in later cases will have to decide which claim is stronger: faith or individual identity.  
Conclusion 
In considering Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, I examined what kind of impacts this 
decision will have on individual employees, corporations and on free exercise law more 
generally. I found that this decision, while having some support from previous Court 
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decisions, is largely unprecedented. Even though the full effect of the decision is not 
clear, the Court will undoubtedly hear future legal challenges based on this decision. 
After all, hundreds of companies are in the federal court system right now trying to get 
their exemption to the contraception mandate. However, the issues in Burwell are much 
broader than contraception. By introducing the concept of religious freedom for for-profit 
corporations, the Court opened up a multitude of new legal questions, chief among them 
this new balancing act between corporate religious freedom on one hand and individual 
anti-discrimination claims on the other. It is unclear whether the Supreme Court will hear 
similar religious freedom challenges by corporations.  Regardless of the outcome, the 
Court will have to weigh these arguments in the future, and that is the chief impact of 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby.  
The recent debate over state-level RFRAs in Indiana and Arkansas spells out 
another impact of the Burwell ruling. While fully analyzing the connections between the 
Court’s ruling and the actions of these state legislatures would require another paper, it is 
fairly clear that the public debate over the Burwell decision brought RFRA back into the 
public discourse. Certain religiously observant state legislators saw how the federal 
version of RFRA provided a wide shield of protection for actions that are based on 
religious faith for both companies and, more importantly in this case, individuals.  In fact, 
in their original form, these state-level RFRA bills passed in the last few weeks could 
shield individuals from charges of discrimination against other people if they did not 
agree with their “lifestyle.” The law in Indiana (the one in Arkansas had not passed at the 
time of this writing) sparked massive controversy, and state legislators are currently in 
the process of adding in anti-discrimination portions to it because of the backlash. While 
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the Supreme Court certainly did not intend to spark a wave of new state-level RFRAs, 
these bills show a massive unintended consequence of the ruling and a further area for 
research.  
It will also be interesting to see whether future Supreme Courts embrace or ignore 
new challenges to the issues left unresolved by the Court’s Burwell ruling. While this 
paper highlighted a number of possible legal ramifications from the Burwell case, the 
Supreme Court may never hear them because the Court has total control over the cases it 
hears. If a case does make it on appeal to the Supreme Court, the justices could refuse to 
grant cert and let the lower federal courts decide on how to best equalize corporate 
religious freedom and employee identity claims. While it is unclear if the Supreme Court 
will definitively rule on these new legal challenges, this new balancing act between 
corporate religious freedom and individual anti-discrimination claims will substantially 
affect free exercise cases moving forward.  
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